Does the Analytic Philosopher Say ‘No’ to the History of Philosophy?
Analytic philosophy is a prominent school of thought in contemporary Western culture. Providing a satisfactory definition of this movement or tradition in terms of its linguistic, stylistic, geographic, or other features is not an easy task, but it is generally agreed that it was founded by the following four thinkers: Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), George Edward Moore (1873–1958), and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951). Among the traits that are often ascribed to analytic philosophy are rigid argumentation and clarity of prose as well as affinity with the sciences.
In this article, I argue against the fairly widespread misconception that analytic philosophers ignore, in principle, the history of philosophy, especially the works of the classical thinkers from Ancient to Modern times. Relying on a number of examples, I aim to show that, throughout the existence of analytic philosophy, its representatives have been open to the possibility that the history of philosophy can help us solve contemporary problems provided that the historical views are presented in a way that suits current philosophical language and methods. Furthermore, I claim, many analytic philosophers have been inspired by the works and views of historical thinkers and have used the latter in a number of different ways. I propose a classification of those uses and distinguish between five approaches that analytic philosophers have taken towards texts belonging to the history of philosophy.
The first approach amounts to straightforward denial of the usefulness of such texts which, I claim, is exceptional. The second approach is rather common. It consists in a superficial presentation and assessment of the historical texts and views. There is nothing essentially wrong with this method, I hold, as its usual aim is to make a philosophical point, not to attain historical knowledge. The third approach consists in a close philosophical reading of the texts of the past. In this case, too, the aim is not to provide historical knowledge or contextual understanding. While popular in the 1960s, this method of interpretation, in its pure form, is rarely practiced now. By contrast, the fourth approach is concerned with close contextual reading of the historical texts: some analytic philosophers have also acted as professional historians of philosophy. Finally, the fifth approach is a combination of the two previous ones, the philosophical and the contextual interpretation. This way of treating the history of philosophy is increasingly visible in the current academic literature. I conclude that, typically, analytic philosophers do not say ‘no’ to the history of philosophy and do not resist the study of it. This is true now, and it was equally true in the past.