In February of 1946, George Kennan (1904–2005) sent his so-called long telegram to his country’s state department. This memorandum became the basis for the doctrine calling for deterrence and containment of the Red Empire in the days of the Cold War. Kennan’s memorandum symbolically marked the start of changes: the Stalinist land of the Soviets, the leadership of which interpreted World War II and its outcome in the context of worldwide revolution, withdrew from the coalition of victors.

If we read Kennan’s text today, we see that the main set of problems in relations between Russia and the Western world have essentially remained the same. Moscow has backed away from the principles that were put in writing in 1975 in the final act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation. With Putin in charge, the Kremlin is behaving as if Russia has acquired military, economic, and political might that enables it to loudly proclaim its demands and to demand that they be taken into consideration.

Russia’s state ideology is Eurasianism, which speaks of Russia as the special centre that ties Europe and Asia together into a single Eurasian Union stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok. Slavs who live in the former Soviet Union form the core of that Union. A state such as independent Ukraine should not exist at all. The Western-oriented ambitions of its leadership make Ukraine a traitor state. Byelorussia would also become a traitor state in the eyes of the Kremlin if its leaders dare to choose a path of development that diverges from that of Russia.

So-called unstable and divided states form the next group of successors of the former Soviet Union: Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. According to the deep conviction of Russia’s leadership, all these states belong to the ‘Russian world’ both historically and in substance, and they do not have the right to full sovereignty. The new states of Central Asia (the so-called -stans – Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan) proceed in the wake of Islam as an ideology and of the cult of the leader (personality cult) that is an integral part of Islam. According to Russia’s traditional understanding, these states are tribal societies (so-called tribes with flags) that strive to present themselves as centralised national states. The little countries Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which were part of the Soviet Union, are considered turncoats in the eyes of the Kremlin since they bandwagoned themselves on the coattails of the USA and other leading countries of the Western world after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Kremlin’s great objective is to make Russia’s geopolitical status such that not a single serious problem in the world can be solved without Russia. First and foremost, anti-American sentiments need to be incited in Europe. The departure of the British from the European Union (Brexit) was a change in a favourable direction for Russia. The settling of scores that has taken place throughout history between the Germans and the French must not be allowed to fade into oblivion. Instead, the particular interests and ambitions of both countries have to be incited. ‘Democratic-progressive’ elements abroad as well as all manner of extremist protest movements (for instance, the peace movement, flat earthers, deniers of national borders, extreme animal rights and environmental activists, corona deniers and opponents of vaccination) need to be used as much as possible to apply pressure to influence the governments of Western countries to act in accordance with Russia’s interests.

Russia’s invariable imperial aspiration is to maintain and expand its sphere of influence, in other words sphere of interest. Generally speaking, the intensiveness of Russia’s interests is inversely proportional to distance from Russia’s borders, yet each and every opportunity for establishing new footholds throughout the world has to be used. Russia’s intelligence services must come to grips with preventing so-called colourful revolutions from breaking out in its satellite (vassal) states in order to avoid the changes in orientation that such revolutions entail.

All actual and potential slippage of traitor states out of Russia’s sphere of influence has to be tirelessly fought against using all available means (including military). Pressure has to be applied to the leaders of the unstable states among the foreign countries near Russia (for instance, by way of military bases) in order to coerce them to choose the only correct course of action, which is approved by Russia. All manner of obstruction has to be directed against development in turncoat states (for instance, inhibition of economic life, disputing the course of national borders, calling into question the legitimacy of their establishment, damaging their international prestige) so that their prosperity does not become a success story that would tempt others to follow suit.

According to the view put forward by the Kremlin’s propaganda machine, Russia lives surrounded by enemies in a ‘siege encirclement’, like the former Soviet Union. The objective of the Western world is the liquidation of Russia as a civilisation. Russia has no close friends among other countries and peoples, yet it has had serious quarrels and disputes with many states at some period in history. Although Russia’s official position envisions the inevitable relocation of the centre of the world from Europe (the Western world) to Asia, and that the contemporary ‘great game’ is taking place in Asia, objectively speaking, Russia cannot expect to gain anything beneficial from that ‘great game’ even if it really is playing out in Asia. Russia lacks the necessary technological and economic potential for actual and effective action in that direction.

Russia’s actual, genuine ‘great game’ is being played out precisely in the direction of the West, in Europe, because that is the only region where it is possible for Russia to win something (back), which seemingly can be attacked without placing Russia itself in danger. Regardless of the fact that the Western world, together with its pacifism and its focus on introspection, has not been any kind of threat whatsoever to Russia already for long decades, a picture has been created in Moscow of the West as something especially dangerous and as an aggressive region. On 24 February 2022, Russia’s army attacked its sovereign neighbouring country Ukraine and launched extensive military operations aimed at liquidating that country.

The Kremlin’s malarkey regarding the relocation of the centre of the entire world to Asia is yet another information operation, a special measure for lulling the Western world as a whole into a false sense of security and to undermine the vigilance of their potential attack victims in Europe in particular. Talk of a turn in the direction of Asia is meant to conceal this circumstance from the Western world. It would be especially agreeable to Russia’s leaders if people on the opposite shore of the Atlantic Ocean were to start taking this disinformation seriously.

Russia’s leadership is exceedingly painstakingly neutral, or even sycophantically friendly, towards China in regard to the growth of China’s influentiality in its vicinity and throughout the world. Russia’s leadership strives to depict Russian-Chinese relations as close and warm relations between allies, practically a serious economic and military alliance that is directed against the West. Figuratively speaking, actual relations between Russia and China are like the relations between Byelorussia and Russia: Xi relates to Putin like Putin relates to Lukashenko. Viewed from a clientelistic position, Russia is the vassal and China is the suzerain.

The West’s greatest challenge in its relations with Russia is of a mantal nature first and foremost. To begin with, we should accept the understanding that Russians have their own values and beliefs, which do not coincide with those of Western people. Transforming Russia into something else cannot be the Western world’s objective. Yet the defence of the North Atlantic block’s allies and the fortification of their security, principally in Europe, is certainly the West’s common vital interest, regardless of what Russia thinks about the matter or what happens to Russia itself. Thus, the current exceptionally tense relations between Russia and the Western world can also be viewed as a challenge. If we successfully rise to this challenge, it will make us, in other words the collective West, stronger.